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CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INDEPENDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional court, a distinct institution of the state that commands high 
authority, is competent for the protection of constitutionality and as such it is a 
legacy of modern times. As such it has been developed continuously. Like the law 
itself („law in public action”), constitutional court has been meeting various 
challenges and dilemmas, as well as open issues that necessitate continuous 
reforms.     
 
Constitutional judiciary is the “crown jewel” of the legal protection and the rule 
of law and its core functions are to limit, rationalize and control the power of state 
and social power. The functions thereof represent a “substantive co(operation) 
resting upon the fundamental consensus”  i.e. on the constitution as a legal 
founding block of the legal order in state and society. 
 
The constitution as a part of (political) culture of a country, that has its founding 
function and it operates as its integration factor; the symbol of statehood and 
according to the “open spirit” philosophy (Carl Poper) opens itself towards 
progress, future; a written constitution is a changeable regulatory optimum. It is a 
reflection of public opinion and the reality, it has a managerial function.  
 
In functional terms, constitutional judiciary has been identified as an effective 
barrier to authoritarianism.  
 
REFERENDUM 
Montenegro  - a state of hundred years – became an independent state again on 
the merit of its citizens’ decision at the referendum on  May 21, 2006. It soon 
became a member of the United Nations, and in 2007 it also became a member of 
the Council of Europe whose statute in its preamble promotes respect of human 
rights and individual political freedoms which every genuine democracy rests 
upon as the core value of the Council of Europe. In this way Montenegro renewed 
its independence after 88 years. It needed a new constitution for the new, renewed 
state since “the state and the constitution are purpose to each other, and the need 
for constitution correlates with the need to earn statehood”. In October 2007 the 
Constitution of Montenegro was promulgated as “the highest norm in rank and the 
most succinct norm in the hierarchy of law” (Peter Haberle, Constitutional State, 
Zagreb 2002, p. 145).  
 
The purpose and aim of adopting the Constitution is the establishment of 
democratic constitutional order which, although as imperfect as any other man-
made system, represents the best system of rule that humankind has ever come up 
with as argued by Churchill (1874-1965). 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF MONTENEGRO 
The Constitution of Montenegro from 2007 established the Constitutional Court 
as an authority distinct from other branches of power and it was vested with 
safeguarding constitutionality and legality i.e. constitutional-legal structures and 
human rights and freedoms that are enshrined in the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court of Montenegro, as the guardian of constitutional democracy, 
decides about the situations in which other branches of power do not administer 
disputes in compliance with the principle of the rule of law. The guarantee of the 
“rule of law” is one of the criteria for accession to the EU that it spelled out in the 
so called Copenhagen criteria requesting each state-candidate to achieve inter alia 
“the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities”.  
 
In addition to other core values such as: freedom, peace, tolerance, respect of 
human rights and freedoms, multiculturalism and democracy, the Constitution of 
Montenegro in its preamble spells put the basic commitments of the peoples to be 
the rule of law; and in its articles 1 and 2 it defines the state as civic, democratic, 
ecological and welfare state based on the rule of law. 
 
 
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF INDEPENDENCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY 
 
Constitutional doctrine and international acts on independence of regular courts, 
in reference to constitutional judiciary provide guarantees of the independence of 
the constitutional court as the most superior legal act in the country. 
 
The basic UN principles define the independence of judiciary in its first principle: 
“The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined 
in the Constitution or the law of the country”. 
 
The Recommendation R(94)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe on the independence, efficiency and role of judges sets the following 
principle: “The independence of judges should be guaranteed pursuant to the 
provisions of the Convention and constitutional principles, for example by 
inserting specific provisions in the constitutions or other legislation or 
incorporating the provisions of this recommendation in internal law.” “The 
executive and legislative powers should ensure that judges are independent and 
that steps are not taken which could endanger the independence of judges”. 
 
Consequently, international standards are binding for the states to provide legal- 
normative guarantees of independence of judiciary that primarily refer to the 
manner in which judges are appointed, their responsibilities and their removal, 
mandate, immunity and material status.  
 
One of the major guarantees for the independence of constitutional judiciary is the 
selection method, appointment of a judge of constitutional court and the 
competent body in charge of that. Comparative constitutionality gives examples 
of various practices/procedures of appointment of the judges of constitutional 
court ranging from the participation of only one authority of the state, then other 
body representing state (parliament, judicial council etc.), to the participation of 
several bodies of the state in that procedure, then the system in which one body 
nominates and the other appoints the judge. Each of these systems has its relative 
merit, and the best one is considered to be the one that guarantees the 
independence and competence of constitutional court judge.  
 
The nomination procedure for the judges of constitutional court determines in fact 
the composition of constitutional court. Each judge’s personal profile is the 
crucial determinant of the quality of the court’s delivery; the nomination and 
appointment procedure for constitutional judges are an extremely important 
guarantee of constitutional and judicial independence.  
 
Constitutional judge’s position is determined by the duration of tenure. In relation 
to this there is always an issue about what could be the best solution for 
constitutional judiciary: either a long or short tenure of its judges, renewable 
tenures or unlimited “lifelong” tenure of judges; but also the dilemma on whether 
a longer tenure automatically ensures continuity and greater creativity of the work 
of constitutional court or, contrary to that, leads to the bureaucratization of that 
institution.  
 
The next guarantee of independence of constitutional court is related to 
incompatibility1 i.e. certain limitations ensuing from the very nature of 
constitutional judicial function. It refers to the extra-judicial activities, either 
public or private which are in some way incompatible with the function of 
constitutional court. The incompatibility principle has been applied for a long 
time in modern European countries and, by rule, it has been elevated to the level 
of constitutional principle. This principle eliminates possibility of parallel 
functions of constitutional judge and any other public function, or any other 
professional activity, engagement etc.          
   
Constitutional court judges cannot engage in extrajudicial activities that can 
compromise their judicial impartiality. A constitutional court judge has to meet 
high standards of conduct in his/her everyday life as it reflects upon the identity 
and integrity of judicial independence. When it comes to extrajudicial activities, 
                                                 
1
 The purpose of this principle is to provide protection of constitutional court judge from influence 
of any authority of the state and from all subjects that adopt general legal acts which can be 
reviewed by constitutional court on the grounds constitutionality and legality.   
particularly political2 ones, its noteworthy that this is where the principle of 
limited freedom of political activity is applied. This means not just a formal ban 
on political party membership, but genuine limitation as an expression of the need 
to preserve the independence and impartiality of constitutional court.  
 
The issue of immunity3 of constitutional court judges is also very important in 
analysis of impartiality of constitutional court and constitutional judge. In 
constitutional court of European countries the status of judge in terms of 
immunity is similar and they have higher or lower level of immunity. Immunity as 
the concept covers the freedom of opinion and vote in deliberation (substantive 
immunity) and protection from incarceration and criminal and other proceedings 
(procedural immunity) unless a competent body so approves.. In many countries 
constitutional judges are granted the same immunity as the MPs get, and in others 
they have only a functional immunity. 
 
An important presumption for the independence of constitutional court is its 
financial independence since there can be no true independence without financial 
independence in exercising core functions. If there is no such autonomy and when 
the government or parliament determine the court’s budget, they can have a big 
influence on the work of the court.  
 
A great contributor to the independence of juridical function is the material status 
of judges i.e. judges’ salaries. This guarantee is perceived as the primary 
prerequisite of the independence of constitutional court. Appropriate material 
status of judges of constitutional courts can be a barrier to improper impact on 
judges’ personal and moral integrity. 
 
Regarding the salary of constitutional court judges, comparative law can only 
provide general criteria (clear and definite) since the salaries for judges have to fit 
into the general standards in a country.  
 
Anyway, state has to guarantee appropriate material status for judges of 
constitutional courts to a level that balances against the gravity and dignity of the 
function of constitutional judge. If we start from general international standard on 
                                                 
2
 L. M. Singhvi, the author of the draft UN Declaration on the independence of Judiciary, wrote: 
..”No matter what judges do or fail to do, controversies on the question of "politisation" of the 
judiciary will always remain in greater or lesser measure, because the judiciary does not function 
in a vacuum. It is possible to increase professionalisation of the judiciary and reduce its 
politisation by changing methods and sources of recruitment and by placing security of tenure and 
prospects of promotion beyond the reach of any patronage by the Executive and the Legislature. 
But the modern judiciary would still have to decide questions which are political in nature, have 
political consequences and which inevitably bring the judges within the range of political fire”, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/18/Add.I (1985), it. 93. 
3
 Immunity of constitutional judges involves the principle by which a judge is free to present 
his/her views on any issue under deliberation and that a judge to a certain degree has to be 
protected in a criminal procedure that can be instituted against him/her on the grounds of the 
offence committed while exercising the constitutional judiciary office  by being exempted from 
incarceration without an approval given by a competent authority. 
just and satisfactory remuneration as an equivalent for invested work, then the 
issue of salary for judges should meet that standard combined with special 
international standard valid only for the judges of constitutional courts. This 
standard for salaries and pensions4 of the constitutional judges implies that 
salaries and pensions should be appropriate, commensurate with the status, 
dignity and responsibility of that function. 
 
Regarding judges’ delivery, we are faced with the issue of judges’ legal 
responsibility.  A specific form of this responsibility is disciplinary 
accountability5, which is defined as accountability in case a judge infringes on the 
duty or obligation related to work or in case of his/her tardy judicial work. 
 
However, disciplinary responsibility is treated differently in relation to judges of 
regular courts as compared to constitutional judges. While the disciplinary 
proceeding for regular court judges is a rule, the issue of disciplinary 
accountability of constitutional judges is treated in different manner. In that 
regard, the constitutions and the laws on constitutional court in most of the 
European countries do not contain provisions on their disciplinary accountability.  
 
The abovementioned constitutional and other guarantees make the foundation of 
independence of judges in their discharge of judicial function but alone they do 
not provide for true independence because constitutionally declared independence 
does not materialize into practice automatically.  
 
GUARANTEES OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
OF MONTENEGRO 
 
The Constitution of Montenegro6 (promulgated on October 22, 2007) has 
generally speaking opted for European “Austrian” continental model of 
constitutional judiciary according to which the constitutional court is separated 
from the structures of state authorities7 as an instrument of constitutionalization in 
terms of limiting and controlling state power, as a distinct body that protects 
constitutionality and legality i.e. constitutional-legal order, human rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. As a guardian of constitutional 
democracy, constitutional court decides in the situations when other bodies of 
                                                 
4
 … that judges who have reached the legal age of judicial retirement, having performed their 
judicial duties for a fixed period, are paid a retirement pension, the level of which must be as close 
as possible to the level of their final salary as a judge - European Charter on the Statute for Judges, 
Article 6, item 6.4 
5
 International documents related to the standards of judicial independence have defined general 
conditions and standards for disciplinary responsibility of judges so that this responsibility has to 
be stipulated in the law and envisaged only for the most serious breach of disciplinary principles 
i.e. for breaching standards of judicial conduct as stipulated by law. 
6
 Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 1/07 
7
 the rule is organized by the principle of division of powers: legislative - delivered by the 
Parliament; executive power - exercised by the government; and judiciary - exercised by the court; 
the power is limited by the Constitution and the law; constitutionality and legality  is protected by 
the Constitutional Court (Article 11, paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 6). 
power do not adjudicate disputes in compliance with the principle of the rule of 
law.  
 
The Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro8 proclaimed the principles of 
independence and impartiality of the Constitutional Court. Pursuant to this law: 
“No one shall have any influence on the Constitutional Court and its process of 
deciding about the issues from its jurisdiction.”9   
 
The competence of the Constitutional Court is on the whole a constitutional 
subject matter (material constitutionis). Within nine areas of the court’s 
competencies10, the Constitutional Court of Montenegro deliberates on all forms 
of “breaches of the Constitution”, one of them being: constitutional-legal disputes 
that are not typical “constitutional disputes”.  
 
One particularly important competence of the Constitutional Court stipulated in 
the new Constitution is consideration of constitutional complaints, which was not 
a part of legal system in Montenegro, at least not in this form. This legal remedy 
enables any person (either physical or legal) to request institutional protection of 
human rights and basic freedoms in national jurisdiction before lodging 
application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.  
 
The Constitutional Court has seven judges11. The judges of the Constitutional 
Court are appointed to the term of nine years at the proposal of the President of 
Montenegro and after their appointment by the Parliament of Montenegro. A 
candidate for a constitutional judge has to be a person who is a prominent lawyer 
who is held in high professional esteem. The President of the Court is also a 
constitutional category. The Parliament appoints the President to the term of three 
years after a proposal given by the President of Montenegro choosing among 
judges. The President of the Constitutional Court is a judge at the same time.  
                                                 
8
 Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 64/08 dated October 27, 2008 
9
 Constitutional Court deliberates cases independently and impartially for which it has jurisdiction 
stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro. No one shall influence the court’s  
decision upon issues from its jurisdiction (Article 2, Ibid).   
10
 The Constitutional Court  deliberates about: 1) Conformity of laws with the 
Constitution and confirmed and published international agreements; 2) Conformity of other 
regulations and general acts with the Constitution and the law; 3) Constitutional appeal due to the 
violation of human rights and liberties granted by the Constitution, after all other efficient legal 
remedies have been exhausted;4) Whether the President of Montenegro has violated the 
Constitution; 5) The conflict of responsibilities between courts and other state authorities, between 
state authorities and local self-government authorities, and between the authorities of the local self-
government units; 6) Prohibition of work of a political party or a non-governmental organization; 
7) Electoral disputes and disputes related to the referendum, which are not the responsibility of 
other courts; 8) Conformity with the Constitution of the measures and actions of state authorities 
taken during the state of war or the state of emergency; 9) Performs other tasks stipulated by the 
Constitution. (Article 149 of the Constitution). 
   
11
 Article 153, paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution. 
 The function of a judge of the Constitutional Court is incompatible12 with any 
other public function or professional engagement. 
 
The President of the Constitutional Court enjoys the same immunity as the 
members of the Parliament13. This is to say that the President and judges of the 
Constitutional Court cannot be criminally prosecuted nor incarcerated unless the 
Parliament so allows and unless they have been caught performing a criminal 
offence punishable by more than five years of imprisonment. 
 
The Constitutional Court of Montenegro  stipulates four grounds14 for termination 
of office prior to the expiry of the period for which he/she was elected: 1) at 
his/her own request, 2) if s/he qualifies for pension based on age; 3)s/he has been 
sentenced to an unconditional imprisonment sentence and 4) by removal. 
 
The President and judge of the Constitutional Court shall be removed  for any act 
that deems him/her unworthy of the judicial function, if s/he permanently looses 
capacity to deliver the function or comes public with his/her political convictions. 
The Constitutional Court summons a session at which the reasons for removal are 
discussed and it informs the Parliament about the decision thereof. The 
Constitutional Court can decide to suspend the President or a judge of the 
Constitutional Court against whom the criminal procedure has been instituted. 
 
The Law on Constitutional Court defines the procedure for removal from the 
office in detail15.  
                                                 
12 “The President and the judge of the Constitutional Court shall not discharge duties of a Member 
of the Parliament or other public duties or professionally perform some other activity.” (Article 
153, paragraph 5 of the Constitution) 
 
13 The President of Montenegro, the Prime Minister and members of the Government, the 
President of the Supreme Court, the President and the judges of the Constitutional Court, and the 
Supreme State Prosecutor shall enjoy the same immunity as the Member of the Parliament. 
(Article 86, paragraph 4 of the Constitution) 
 
14
 Article 154 of the Constitution. 
15
 Judge of the Constitutional Court shall submit request for termination of office before the expiry 
of e term to which he has been elected to the President of Montenegro and to the Parliament; if the 
Parliament does not adopt a decision on the request referred to in paragraph 1 of this article within 
30 days as of the date of its submission, the office of the judge of the Constitutional Court shall 
terminate upon the expiry of that time-limit. (Article 7) 
  
Competent court shall with no delay notify the Constitutional Court about the institution of the 
criminal proceeding against the President or the judge of the Constitutional Court.  
In the situation referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, the proposal to terminate the office of the 
President of the Constitutional Court shall be submitted by at least three judges of the 
Constitutional Court, and the proposal to terminate the office of the judge of the Constitutional 
Court shall be submitted by the President of the Constitutional Court.  
The quoted constitutional and legal guarantees are based on international 
standards both in terms of institutional and individual independence of the 
constitutional court judges. The Constitution, however, does not have the 
provision on obligations to provide appropriate material status for judges of the 
Constitutional Court nor an obligation to adopt a special act that would enable 
enforcement of the declared constitutional principles and the role of the 
Constitutional Court in the legal order and concrete circumstances. The issue of 
financial independence of judges of the Constitutional Court has not been 
regulated by the Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro either. Instead, it 
was regulated by the Law on salaries and other remunerations for the holders of 
judicial functions16.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having in mind the importance that the constitutional court has in terms of 
protecting the constitutional order and particularly the rule of law and protection 
of human rights and freedoms, its independence merits continuous efforts on 
improving its position as the institutional pillar for provision of democracy, 
limitation of power, protection of human rights and the rule of law.   
    
   
                                                                                                                                     
The president or the judge upon whose exercise of office is going to be decided shall not 
participate in the decision making. (Article 8)  
 
The initiative for determining whether the requirements for the termination of office, because of 
meeting the conditions for old-age pension or because the conviction on unconditional prison 
sentence, are fulfilled, or the initiative for determining the reasons for termination of office of the 
judge of the Constitutional Court, shall be submitted by the President of the Constitutional Court, 
and for the President of the Constitutional Court shall be submitted by at least three judges of the 
Constitutional Court  
Competent court shall with no delay notify the Constitutional Court about the delivery of the final 
convicting verdict against the President or the judge of the Constitutional Court. (Article 9)  
  
The Constitutional Court shall notify the President of Montenegro and the Parliament on the 
expiry of the term of office of a judge of the Constitutional Court and of the fact that the judge has 
met the old-age pension requirements, no later than six months before the requirements for 
termination of office are fulfilled. (Article 10)  
 
16
 Law on Salaries and other Remmunerations of Holeders of Judicial Functions (official Gazette 
of the RoM, No, 36/07 and 53/07) 
